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MENTIAL

8 December 1960

MOSCOW MEETING

- I. After three weeks of hard wrangling at Moscow conference of 81

 Communist parties (all but 6 of those Communists claim exist), the parties have subscribed to about 16,000-word manifesto.
 - A. Much of the document is a reaffirmation of positions on which Moscow and Peiping, and the other parties, have long agreed.
 - B. Much of it, however, is a mixture—by no means a reconciliation—of Soviet and Chinese positions on issues on which they have disagreed and apparently continue to disagree.
 - C. Thus communique seems to represent a stand-off rather than a "victory" for either party.
- II. Of what we regard as the 17 principal issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute--most of them relating to what Bloc strategy should be-the manifesto seems to lean to the Soviet position on six, to lean to the Chinese on four, and to be too ambivalent or evasive for any judgment on seven.
 - A. For instance, on issues of war and peace, the manifesto leans to the Soviets on the terrible consequences of general war, leans to the Chinese in emphasizing imperialist preparations for such a war, and reaffirms their longustanding agreement that the "Socialist Camp" is so strong that it can deter general war or win one if it occurs.
 - 1. The document is very evasive on the question of whether, as the Chinese contend, the Bloc should expect and support local wars.

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
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- 2. As for "peaceful coexistence," it leans to Moscow on the struggle for peace as the "most vital" task and on long-range economic competition being decisive, while it leans a bit to Peiping on the harsh struggle to be waged within the terms of coexistence.
- B. On crucial problem of discipline of world Communist movement, manifesto is again ambivalent.
 - 1. It leans to Moscow on the need to adhere to agreed positions and to have private meetings instead of lobbying against one another's positions.
 - 2. But it leans to Peiping on the "equality" of the parties and on the Soviet party as a "vanguard" party rather than the ultimate authority.
- C. The document does not, of course, discuss such sensitive questions in Sino-Soviet relations as Moscow's withdrawal of great majority of Soviet technicians last August.
 - 1. We do not know whether the Russians, in exchange for a degree of Chinese cooperation at this conference, agreed to lift economic sanctions.

III.		there was fierce infighting at
	Mos	cow to reach even this indecisive and at points ludicrous manifesto,
1	A.	Liu Shao-chi, senior Chinese delegate,
		made four-hour speech in which he attacked Khrushchev personally,
		and that Khrushchev blew up at least twice.

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В.	Several parties	at least tensupported the	
	Chinese in varying degrees, the	Albanians most strongly.	25X1
	(Latter were finally told by both	h sides to shut up).	

IV. Obviously, the manifesto itself solves nothing.

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- A. Like the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, and even more so, this document can be cited by both Moscow and Peiping in support of very different views.
 - 1. In fact, the first Pravda and People's Daily editorials
 (6 December) on the manifesto have different emphases.
- B. We may see a repetition of the events that followed the Bucharest Conference last June--a temporary cessation of polemics, then a number of partisan interpretations, heated retorts, a resumption of polemics, unsatisfactory bilateral talks, and yet another world Communist conference.
- C. However, we are suspending judgment until we learn whether any private agreements were reached in Moscow--relating to Soviet military and economic aid to China--which might take the pressure off the Soviet party, at least for a time.
- V. Mikoyan and Kosygin have assured Ambassador Thompson that harsh words toward West in statement do not mean that USSR has lost interest in improving relations with US.
 - A. However, militant, anti-Western tone of statement would appear to reduce somewhat Khrushchev's freedom of maneuver toward West and preclude unorthodox tactics he employed in 1959 and early 1960 prior to his break-up of the summit.

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SHIFT

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- B. Khrushchev apparently believes Chinese adherence to statement will for a time inhibit attacks from Peiping while he engages
 West in another round of top-level negotiations.
- C. Statement commits USSR to maintain its present aggressive and uncompromising line in support of anti-Western Afro-Asian governments and national liberation movements. Khrushchev probably now intends to combine return to negotiations with West with vigorous prosecution of "anti-colonial" policy.
- D. By fuzzing language on "local" wars, statement does not affect Chinese attitude toward Taiwan, which is termed "US-occupied" territory.

